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Abstract 
The present study conceptualized peace vision as the view of peace as desirable, 
feasible and requiring substantial concessions by both parties and examined the 
social-emotional factors contributing to its endorsement among Israeli Jews (N = 
400). In line with our theorizing, we found that trust in Palestinians and inclusive 
victim perceptions (the view that both conflicting groups have suffered due to the 
conflict) were significantly and positively associated with peace vision endorsement 
both directly and indirectly, through facilitating forgiveness. We discuss the 
theoretical and practical implications of these results in terms of the sustainability of 
peaceful co-existence between conflicting groups. 
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Peace vision and its socio-emotional antecedents:  
The role of forgiveness, trust and inclusive victim perceptions 
 
In order to carry a positive action we must develop here a positive vision. 
Dalai Lama 
 
Groups involved in prolonged, violent, seemingly intractable conflicts 
sometimes reach a point where they may be willing to end the conflict, for example, 
due to conflict fatigue (Kelman, 2004). However, just as removing weeds is not 
enough to make a garden flourish, the wish to end the conflict is not enough to bring 
about peace, as it must be founded on a clear vision regarding the nature of this peace 
(see Pittinsky, 2012, for similar reasoning). In particular, we argue that such peace 
vision requires group members to realize that peace is desirable (i.e., serves their 
ingroup's interest), feasible (despite deep-rooted intergroup rivalry), and necessitates 
substantial concessions by both parties (such that both, and not just the outgroup, are 
responsible for its success or failure). The goal of the present research is to elucidate 
the concept of peace vision, comprised of these three related beliefs, and point to 
socio-emotional factors contributing to its endorsement.  
The first belief comprising peace vision regards its desirability: conflicting 
groups may not necessarily view peace as a desirable goal that best serves their 
ingroup's interests. For example, they may perceive the overall costs involved in 
maintaining the conflict (e.g., casualties and damage to property) as lower than the 
costs involved in reaching peace (e.g., giving up territory and control over sacred 
places) (Bar-Tal, Halperin, & Oren, 2010). This perception may be particularly 
pronounced when group members believe that their present position will improve in 
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the future, enabling them to eventually win the conflict and avoid the costs of peace 
(Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011). A peace vision thus requires group members to realize 
that despite its inevitable costs, the cessation of conflict is in their best interest (Gayer, 
Landman, Halperin, & Bar-Tal, 2009). Such a realization is reflected in Israel's 
former Prime Minister Menachem Begin's statement, when signing the then 
controversial peace agreement with Egypt, that "[t]he hardships of peace are better 
than the pain of war."The second belief comprising peace vision regards its 
feasibility: even if group members do believe that peace is in their best interest, they 
may still think that it is not feasible because there is "no partner" (Halperin & Bar-Tal, 
2007, p. 5). Namely, peace cannot be achieved because the other conflict party is 
unwilling to end the cycle of violence and reach a compromise. In fact, the societal 
belief that the ingroup genuinely wishes peaceful coexistence whereas the outgroup 
wants war and bloodshed has been identified by Bar-Tal (2007) as one of the key 
themes in the ethos of conflict (i.e., shared societal beliefs that constitute the narrative 
about the conflict's nature). This belief fuels the conflict because it helps group 
members maintain their ingroup's positive image as just and moral regardless of its 
aggressive acts (Bar-Tal, 2000). Hence, a peace vision must include not only the 
belief that peace is desirable but also the belief that it is viable; that is, peace must not 
be viewed as a vague and romantic future option, but rather as a concrete possibility 
(see Bar-Tal, 2000; 2007). 
Finally, the third belief is concerned with group members' realization that both 
groups must make substantial compromise in order to achieve peace. In particular, 
group members may find it extremely difficult to make the concessions required for 
reaching peace. According to Rouhana (2004), peace and reconciliation entail various 
risks in terms of "threats to national identity and national narrative, political 
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restructuring, and permanent political loss" (p. 40). To illustrate, reaching a peaceful 
solution may require groups to accept collective guilt for their wrongdoing, which 
runs counter to their members' wish to preserve a positive, moral social identity 
(Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006), as well as to relinquish core religious and 
national aspirations (Bar-Tal et al., 2010). Thus, even group members who view peace 
as desirable and feasible often “talk the talk” without “walking the walk” of 
supporting substantial compromise; this may be particularly true of members of the 
more powerful group, for whom the risks and costs of peace (e.g., loss of dominance) 
are higher than those of the less powerful group (Rouhana, 2004). Hence, in addition 
to desirability and feasibility, a peace vision must refer to the means through which 
peace can actually be achieved – it must articulate the realization that peace requires a 
cut-to-the-bone compromise on both sides.  
Note that while we acknowledge that these three beliefs are different from 
each other, we nevertheless argue that they should be considered together, as all are 
critical elements of peace vision. Endorsing one or two of these beliefs without the 
third implies lack of genuine commitment to achieving peace. In fact, as illustrated in 
our discussion of the feasibility dimension above, such partial endorsement often 
serves as a barrier to peace.  
The role of forgiveness in promoting peace vision  
Whereas previous research has focused on the role of "cold" cognitive factors 
such as cost-benefit calculations (Gayer et al., 2009) in promoting the endorsement of 
peace vision, the present research focuses on a "warm," socio-emotional factor of 
intergroup forgiveness. Specifically, we examined the association between 
forgiveness and the endorsement of peace vision among Israeli Jews.  
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Building on McCullough et al.'s (1998) theorizing, we suggest that a group 
can respond to its victimization by another through retaliation (e.g., militant actions), 
disengagement (e.g., building a separation wall), or forgiveness, namely, engagement 
in constructive efforts to restore the fractured relationship between the groups, while 
letting go of past grudges. Over the last decade, a growing body of social 
psychological research has explored intergroup forgiveness as a means for shifting the 
focus of intergroup relations from the painful past to a positive future (Hewstone et 
al., 2004; Hewstone, Cairns, Voci, Hamberger, & Niens, 2006; Noor, Brown, 
Gonzalez, Manzi, & Lewis, 2008; Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008; Noor, Brown, 
Taggart, Fernandez, & Coen, 2010; Wohl & Branscombe, 2005).  
Admittedly, some researchers have warned of potential negative consequences 
of forgiveness, such as providing impunity to the perpetrating group (Staub, 
Pearlman, Gubin, & Hagengimana, 2005) and reducing the victim group's motivation 
to act for social change (Greenaway, Quinn, & Louis, 2011). Nevertheless, 
forgiveness has also been repeatedly observed as contributing to various positive 
intergroup outcomes. To illustrate, across correlational and longitudinal data-sets 
Noor, Brown, Gonzalez and colleagues (2008) found that forgiveness was a robust 
and positive correlate of reconciliation attitudes among Protestants and Catholics in 
Northern Ireland. Similarly, Čehajic, Brown, and Castano (2008) found that 
forgiveness for misdeeds during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was positively 
associated with Bosnian Muslims' reduced wish to distance themselves from Bosnian 
Serbs, and Wohl and Branscombe (2005) reached similar conclusions in the context 
of contemporary relations between North American Jews and Germans. Thus, along 
with theorizing regarding its evolutionary advantages (McCullough, 2008) and 
therapeutic value (Enright & Fitzgibbons, 2000), forgiveness seems to serve, at least 
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under certain circumstances, as a socio-emotional route for repairing damaged 
intergroup relations.  
Based on this logic, we theorized that by transforming an ingroup’s 
psychological orientation towards the adversarial outgroup (Staub, 2008), forgiveness 
can enable groups to envisage peaceful coexistence as a desirable and feasible 
outcome that is worth compromising for. That is, we hypothesized that forgiveness 
attitudes would be positively associated with the endorsement of peace vision (H1).  
Trust and inclusive victim perceptions as antecedents of forgiveness and peace 
vision 
 Previous research (for a meta-analysis, see Van Tongeren, Burnette, O’Boyle, 
Worthington, & Forsyth, 2014) has identified several antecedents of intergroup 
forgiveness, including empathy (e.g., perspective taking) and intergroup contact (e.g., 
Hewstone et al., 2006); reduced anger and infra-humanization (e.g., Tam et al., 2007); 
and collective guilt (e.g., Hewstone et al., 2004). The present study focuses on two 
other key antecedents identified in the literature: intergroup trust (Hewstone et al., 
2006) and inclusive perceptions of victimhood (acknowledging that both sides have 
experienced victimization, Vollhardt, 2009; 2012; 2013), shown in previous research 
to affect Israeli Jews' forgiveness tendencies (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006, and Shnabel, 
Halabi, & Noor, 2013, respectively). We aimed to replicate and extend these findings 
by testing the role of trust and inclusive victim perceptions in promoting forgiveness 
as well as consequent peace vision endorsement.  
Trust. Theorizing on revenge and forgiveness suggests that the decision to 
forgive one's adversary depends on "estimating the risk of future exploitation by the 
harmdoer and the expected future value of the relationship with the harmdoer" 
(McCullough, Kurzban, & Tabak, 2013, p. 1). That is, people will choose this strategy 
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only if they believe that they can benefit from restoring positive relations with the 
other-conflict party, and that their willingness to show benevolence despite the 
transgression will not lead to further exploitation by the transgressor. Otherwise, 
imposing retaliatory costs on their aggressors in order to create deterrence constitutes 
a better strategy to prevent future transgressions (McCullough, et al., 2013; see also 
Burnette, McCullough, Van Tongeren & Davis, 2012). The prediction derived from 
this theorizing is that trust – the belief the perpetrator group now has positive 
intentions towards the ingroup and that despite the painful past it is possible to 
establish cooperative, mutually beneficial relations with it (see Carnevale, 1995) – is a 
prerequisite for forgiveness (Hewstone et al., 2008). In the absence of trust, even 
conciliatory gestures by the perpetrator group are likely to be interpreted as 
manipulative ploys. To illustrate, Nadler and Liviatan (2006) found that among Israeli 
Jews with a low level of trust in Palestinians, exposure to an empathic message from a 
Palestinian representative backfired, leading to lower levels of willingness to forgive 
and reconcile with Palestinians.  
While Nadler and Liviatan (2006) did not directly examine the association 
between trust and forgiveness, their findings imply that, consistent with evidence 
obtained in other contexts of intergroup conflict (e.g., Noor, Brown, Gonzalez et al., 
2008; Hewstone et al., 2006), higher levels of trust in Palestinians should be 
associated with greater forgiveness tendencies among Israeli Jews (H2). As for the 
relation with peace vision endorsement, we expected higher levels of trust to be 
associated with greater endorsement of peace vision both directly (H3), because trust 
is crucial for the belief that peace is feasible as well as for the readiness to make risky 
concessions, and indirectly, through the promotion of forgiveness (H4).  
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 Inclusive victim perceptions. The relations between Palestinians and Jews 
are characterized by significant power asymmetry, as Jews have greater military, 
economical, and political strength (Aggestam, 2002). Nevertheless, through the 
course of the conflict, both parties have transgressed against each other and hence 
served as victims in some situations and as perpetrators in others (Siman Tove-
Nachlieli & Shanbel, 2014). In such contexts of mutual transgressions, members of 
both groups are strongly motivated to establish their own victimhood status, while 
dismissing the suffering of the outgroup (Noor, Shnabel, Halabi, & Nadler, 2012). 
Because the motivation to receive acknowledgement for the ingroup's suffering is 
inconsistent with letting go of the past, groups' engagement in such competitive 
victimhood is associated with reduced forgiveness, as found across various contexts 
(e.g., Noor, Brown, Gonzalez et al., 2008). By contrast, inclusive victim perceptions, 
that is, the belief that both groups have been victimized in the conflict, have been 
found to be associated with greater forgiveness (Vollhardt, 2009; 2012; see also Bilali 
& Vollhardt, 2014). Indeed, the notion that inclusive victim perceptions may lead to 
mutual forgiveness was one of the rationales behind the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions in post-apartheid South Africa (Tutu, 1999; see Rimé, Kanyangara, 
Yzerbyt, & Paez, 2011, for the Gacaca tribunals in Rwanda).  
Of direct relevance to the present research, inducing a common victim identity 
among Israeli Jews and Palestinians (i.e., "both Palestinians and Jews are victims of 
the regional conflict") was found to lead to heightened levels of mutual forgiveness 
(Shnabel et al., 2013). While Shnabel et al. (2013) used an experimental manipulation 
to test the relations between the two variables, their findings imply that even when 
examining the naturally occurring correlation, more inclusive victim perceptions 
should be associated with greater forgiveness tendencies among Israeli Jews (H5). As 
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for the relation with peace vision endorsement, we expected more inclusive victim 
perceptions to be positively associated with greater endorsement of peace vision 
directly (H6), because they may foster belief in the viability of peace – as the other 
conflict party is no longer viewed exclusively as an irrational, evil aggressor – and 
lead to greater appreciation of the pain and loss involved in the continuation of the 
conflict (see Gayer et al., 2009). In addition, we expected inclusive victim perceptions 
to contribute to peace vision indirectly, through the promotion of forgiveness (H7).  
Method 
Respondents 
Four hundred participants from the general Jewish population were surveyed 
in Israel in July 2012. Participants’ age range was: 16.5% = 18-24yrs; 21% = 25-
34yrs; 17% = 35-44yrs; 16% = 45-54yrs; 13% = 55-64yrs; 16.5 = 65 + yrs. About half 
of the sample (48%) consisted of men and the rest (52%) were women. In terms of 
residency, about half of the participants (51%) were from Tel-Aviv metropolitan area, 
24% from Haifa and the north, 13% from Beersheba and the south, and 12% from 
Jerusalem and the West Bank. In terms of stated political orientation, 22% were 
leftists, 31% centrists, and 47% were rightists. The majority (72%) were born in 
Israel, and the rest in the former Soviet Union (11%) and various other countries 
(17%). The majority of participants were married with (53.5%) or without (7.5%) 
children, 26% were single, 12% divorced, and 1% had a different marital status. Most 
participants (66%) were secular, 19% were traditional, and 15% orthodox. About half 
(51%) had an academic degree. Finally, 30% of the participants reported an average 
income, 33.5% were below average, and 30% were above average; 6.5% refused to 
report their income.    
Procedure and Materials 
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The survey company collected data from participants in return for 4 NIS 
(about 1 USD) to compensate them for their time. The online invitation to participate 
was sent to all pool members; data collection was stopped after 400 participants 
completed the survey.  
Measures. All measures used a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). We measured forgiveness with two items (derived 
from Noor et al., 2008): “My group should forgive the Palestinians for the suffering 
they have caused us during the conflict”; and “My group should put the past behind it 
and not hold a grudge against the Palestinians” (r = .73, p = .001). Trust was 
measured with two items (derived from Nadler & Liviatan, 2006): “Thinking of 
Palestinians, do you generally have trust in the good intentions of their leadership?”; 
and “Do you generally have trust in the good intentions of ordinary Palestinians?” (r 
= .55, p = .001). Based on Vollhardt’s (2009) and Noor and colleagues’ (2012) 
conceptualisation of this construct, two items were developed to tap inclusive victim 
perceptions: “In one way or another, we, Palestinians and Israelis, are all victims of 
the regional conflict”; and “The heartache due to losing one’s family members to the 
regional conflict is the same for both Israelis and Palestinians” (r = .47, p = .001). 
Finally, three novel items measured peace vision: “The costs of continuing the 
regional conflict are higher than the costs involved in ending it”; “A shared peaceful 
future between Palestinians and Israelis is possible”; and “Both Israelis and 
Palestinians have to make significant concessions to end the conflict” (α = .78). 
Additionally, participants provided information on a range of variables: 
highest educational attainment, level of income in comparison to the average national 
income (1 = Much below average to 7 = Much above the average), age, gender, 
religious sector (secular, traditional, or orthodox) and degree of religiosity (1 = Very 
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secular to 7 = Very religious), residence, place of birth, marital status, and political 
orientation (1 = leftist to 7 = rightist).  
Results 
Table 1 provides a summary of correlations, means and standard deviations of 
all measured variables. To test our hypotheses, we used the MEDIATE macro 
developed by Hayes and Preacher (2013). This macro enabled us to simultaneously 
test the direct and the indirect effects, mediated through forgiveness, of trust and 
inclusive victim perceptions on peace vision endorsement. Moreover, it allowed us to 
control for all the relevant demographic variables (e.g., political orientation) and thus 
isolate the unique contribution of the socio-emotional factors which were the focus of 
our inquiry. In particular, the MEDIATE macro computed two regression models, 
followed by two bootstrapping analyses of mediation to test for the indirect effects. 
The upper section of Table 2 presents the first regression model, in which forgiveness 
was the criterion variable and trust, inclusive victim perceptions, and the demographic 
variables were the predictors. The obtained model was significant, F(8,391) = 46.00, 
R
2
 = .48, p < .001. As seen in the table, in line with H2 and H5 (respectively), both 
trust and inclusive victim perceptions were significantly and positively associated 
with forgiveness. In addition, political orientation (i.e., being a rightist), religiosity, 
and gender (i.e., being a woman) were negatively associated with forgiveness; 
whereas age positively correlated with it (income and education were not associated 
with forgiveness).   
The middle section of Table 2 presents the second regression model, in which 
peace vision endorsement was the criterion variable, and the predictors were 
forgiveness, trust, inclusive victim perceptions, and the demographic variables. The 
obtained model was significant, F(9,390) = 60.37, R
2
 = .58, p < .001. As seen in the 
13 
 
13 
 
table, consistent with H1, H3 and H6 (respectively), forgiveness, trust and inclusive 
victim perceptions were significantly and positively associated with peace vision 
endorsement. In addition, political orientation (i.e., being a rightist) was negatively 
associated with the endorsement of peace vision, whereas age positively correlated 
with it (religiosity had a marginal negative association, income had a marginally 
positive association, and education and gender were not associated with peace vision 
endorsement).  
In line with H4, the first bootstrapping analysis (5,000 resamples) revealed 
that the indirect effect of trust on peace vision endorsement through forgiveness was 
significant, [B = .083, SE = .025, 95% CI (.039, .137)]. In line with H7, the second 
bootstrapping analysis (5,000 resamples) revealed that the indirect effect of inclusive 
victim perceptions on peace vision endorsement through forgiveness was also 
significant; [B = .069, SE = .019, 95% CI (.035, .108)]. 
Discussion 
 Peace is much more than merely the absence of war (Christie, Tint, Wagner, & 
Winter, 2008). It needs to be envisaged and sustained jointly by conflicting groups. In 
the present work, we first defined peace vision as a combination of three beliefs, 
namely, viewing peace as desirable, feasible and requiring substantial concessions by 
both parties. We then tested whether the endorsement of such a vision among Israeli 
Jews was associated with a set of socio-emotional factors. The results suggest that 
trust and inclusive victim perceptions were positively associated with peace vision 
both directly and indirectly, by facilitating forgiveness.  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the relations 
between these factors in the Israeli-Palestinian context. Our results replicate previous 
findings regarding the role of trust in promoting forgiveness (e.g., Hewstone et al., 
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2006) and the ability of inclusive victim perceptions to promote positive intergroup 
attitudes (e.g., Vollhardt & Bilali, 2014) in other context. Successful replications of 
this nature should not be taken for granted given the challenge of large contextual and 
significant cultural differences; for example, the present study was conducted in a 
context of an ongoing conflict, whereas other studies (e.g., Noor et al., 2008) were 
conducted in contexts of post-violent conflicts such as Northern Ireland and post-
Pinochet Chile.  
Extending previous work on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we also found that 
trust, inclusive victim perceptions, and forgiveness were positively associated with 
peace vision endorsement. Thus, while previous research on the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict focused on cognitive factors affecting peace vision (Gayer et al., 2009), the 
present study established the critical role of socio-emotional factors, the "missing 
piece" that may be critical particularly in intractable conflicts of this kind. From a 
broader theoretical perspective, our study took an initial step in pointing to the 
potential psychological consequences of forgiveness. Notably, the association 
between forgiveness and peace vision, as well as between the latter and the other 
socio-emotional factors, were robust and remained significant even when potentially 
influential demographic variables – including age and political orientation (which 
significantly correlated with both forgiveness and peace vision endorsement) – were 
taken into account. 
Limitations and future directions 
 We tested our hypotheses using cross-sectional data; to establish causality, 
future research should also use longitudinal and experimental designs. Secondly, 
although previous work found similar patterns among both Jews and Palestinians 
(e.g., with regards to the effect of inducing a common victim identity on forgiveness; 
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Shnabel et al., 2013), we acknowledge that future research should directly examine 
the generalizability of our findings to the Palestinian population, as well as in other 
contexts of intergroup conflict. Thirdly, it could be argued that due to the mode of 
data collection (i.e., online, "first comes first participates" invitations) the observed 
results may have been obtained from a biased, self-selected sample (e.g., those who 
are especially interested in the topic). While we acknowledge that a degree of self-
selection may have occurred, the demographics of the present sample, such as gender, 
age, and distribution of places of residence, were fairly representative of the Israeli 
Jewish adult population from 2011 (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2011). Finally, 
online data collection has been found to be effective when studying socially sensitive 
issues, as in the present study, by virtue of ensuring anonymity and a sense of social 
disinhibition (Booth-Kewley, Larson, & Miyoshi, 2007; Ramo, Hall, & Prochaska, 
2010). Nevertheless, future research may benefit from using other data collection 
methods, such as face-to-face interviews that consider respondents' unique 
perspective about the topic.  
Conclusion 
 In sum, this work highlights the importance of peace vision for sustainable, 
peaceful co-existence between conflicting groups. Our data, which were obtained 
from a sample of Israeli Jews with daily experience of the ongoing violent conflict 
with Palestinians, shed light on the social-emotional factors fostering the endorsement 
of such vision. These factors, complementing the ‘cold’ cognitive factors proposed by 
other researchers (Gayer et al., 2009), offer insights into the possible pathways that 
practitioners and professionals of peacebuilding can fruitfully pursue in order to 
educate conflicting groups about the value, costs and benefits of genuine peace in the 
Middle East and further afield.  
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Table 1. Correlations, Means and Standard Deviation for the total sample (N = 400) 
            Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Peace vision - .64** .62** .61** .06 .27** -.35** -.55** .16** -.04 
2. Forgiveness  - .57** .56** .03 .27** .-34** -.52** .16** -.11* 
3. Trust   - .52** -.02 .12* -.28** -.57** .12* .02 
4. Inclusive victim perceptions    - -.04 .15** -.25** -.45** .20** .05 
5. Income     - .10* -.02 -.01 .23** -.05 
6. Age      - -.25** -.25** .09+ -.16 
7. Religiosity       - .39** -.02 .07 
8. Political orientation        - -.14** .05 
9. Education         - -.03 
10. Gender          - 
M 4.50 3.38 2.82 4.77 3.41 - 1.72 4.60 - - 
SD 1.58 1.72 1.26 1.68 2.32 - 1.17 1.60 - - 
+ p < .1, *p < .05, ** p < .01. Gender was coded such that 1 = male, 2 = female. 
Means and standard deviations appear for variables measured using continuous scales; 
frequencies of variables measured using categorical scales (i.e., age, level of 
education and gender) are reported in the Respondents section.  
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Table 2. The Direct and Indirect Effects of Trust, Inclusive Victim Perceptions and 
Forgiveness on Peace Vision Endorsement among Israeli Jews 
—————————————————————————————————— 
    B SE             t           p  
—————————————————————————————————— 
Criterion Variable: Forgiveness 
 
Trust         .387      .065     5.987      .001 
Inclusive Victim Perceptions      .318      .045     7.010      .001 
Political Orientation     -.159       .051    -3.117     .002 
Religiosity       -.132       .059    -2.216     .027 
Income                                            .017      .028       .601      .548 
Education                                           .032      .056       .566      .572 
Gender                             -.345      .127    -2.717     .007 
Age                              .104      .039     2.666      .008 
——————————————————————————————————
— 
Criterion Variable: Peace Vision Endorsement  
 
Forgiveness       .215      .042     5.137      .001 
Trust        .314      .056     5.619      .001 
Inclusive Victim Perceptions     .251      .040     6.286      .001 
Political Orientation     -.118      .043    -2.758     .006 
Religiosity        -.090     .050    -1.813     .071 
Income                              .038      .023     1.653     .099 
Education                                                                      .002      .046       .047     .963 
Gender                             -.015     .106       -.143     .887 
Age                                                                .077     .033      2.367     .018 
—————————————————————————————————— 
Note. N = 400. Political Orientation was coded using a 7-point scale such that 
1 = Leftist and 7 = Rightist, Gender was coded such that 1 = male and 2 = female.   
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Figure 1: the proposed associations between socio-emotional factors leading to peace 
vision endorsement. Standardized regression coefficients (betas) are presented. 
Participants' gender, age, education, income, religiosity, and political orientation are 
controlled for. For the paths between trust and peace vision endorsement, and between 
inclusive victim perceptions and peace vision endorsement the coefficients shown 
outside vs. inside the parentheses represent the direct and total effects, respectively. 
Coefficients with one asterisk indicate beta weights' significance level of p < .001. 
The indirect effects of trust and inclusive victim perceptions on peace vision 
endorsement through forgiveness were significant (confidence intervals are reported 
in the Results section).  
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